?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&rft_val_fmt=info%3Aofi%2Ffmt%3Akev%3Amtx%3Adc&rft.title=Letting+Billions+Slip+Through+Your+Fingers%3A+Empirical+Evidence+and+Legal+Implications+of+the+Failure+of+Financial+Institutions+To+Participate+in+Securities+Class+Action+Settlements+&rft.creator=Cox%2C+James+D.&rft.creator=Thomas%2C+Randall+S.&rft.subject=Securities+Law&rft.subject=Empirical+Research&rft.subject=Dispute+Resolution&rft.description=In+a+pilot+study+we+published+two+years+ago%2C+we+reported+that+nearly+two-thirds+of+the+institutional+investors+with+financial+losses+in+53+settled+securities+class+actions+fail+to+submit+claims.+As+a+consequence+of+this+failure+substantial+sums+they+were+entitled+to+receive+were+given+to+others.%0D%0AThis+article+presents+the+results+of+a+much+more+extensive+investigation+of+the+frequency+with+which+financial+institutions+submit+claims+in+settled+securities+class+actions.++We+combine+an+empirical+study+of+a+much+larger+set+of+settlements+with+the+results+of+a+survey+of+institutional+investors+about+their+claims+filing+practices.+Consistent+with+our+earlier+study%2C+we+find+that+less+than+30%25+of+institutional+investors+with+provable+losses+perfect+their+claims+in+these+settlements.%0D%0AWe+then+explore+the+possible+explanations+for+this+widespread+failure.++We+suggest+a+wide+range+of+potential+problems+from+mechanical+failures+in+the+notification+and+recordkeeping+processes+to+more+subtle+issues+such+as+portfolio+managers'+beliefs+that+only+investment+activities+produce+significant+returns+for+their+clients.++&rft.date=2005&rft.type=Journal+Article&rft.type=NonPeerReviewed&rft.format=application%2Fpdf&rft.identifier=http%3A%2F%2Feprints.law.duke.edu%2F872%2F1%2FCox_58_Stan._L._Rev._411_(2005).pdf&rft.identifier=Cox%2C+James+D.+and+Thomas%2C+Randall+S.+(2005)+Letting+Billions+Slip+Through+Your+Fingers%3A+Empirical+Evidence+and+Legal+Implications+of+the+Failure+of+Financial+Institutions+To+Participate+in+Securities+Class+Action+Settlements.+Stanford+Law+Review%2C+58+.+pp.+411-454.&rft.relation=http%3A%2F%2Feprints.law.duke.edu%2F872%2F